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1	PROCEEDINGS
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3	THE COURT: Cause No. D 1-GN22-6452
4	styled Joan Baker and Inteleos Corporation and Tricia
5	Turner against Joanna Hall and Ultra Safe Ultrasound
6	Diagnostic Services. We are convened again this
7	afternoon to hear the second motion on today's agenda in
8	this case.
9	Mr. Solomon Musyimi appears for the
10	plaintiff. Mr. Shawn Williamson appears, again, for the
11	defendant. And we're here this afternoon on defendant's
12	Motion to Dismiss Chapter 27 of the Civil Practice and
13	Remedies Code. Yes, sir.
14	MR. WILLIAMSON: Your Honor, may I proceed?
15	THE COURT: Please.
16	MR. MUSYIMI: Before we proceed, there is a
17	little housekeeping issue I would like to raise to the
18	Court, respectfully. Your Honor, this Motion to Dismiss
19	was filed on December 20, 2022, and today the date is
20	February 22, 2023. And based on our computations that is
21	a full 64 days and under the Texas Civil Practice and
22	Remedies Code 27.004 it requires the hearing be conducted
23	within 60 days.
24	THE COURT: Or motion is considered to be
25	dismissed by operation of law. Is that what it says?

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1	MR. WILLIAMSON: May I respond, Your Honor?
2	THE COURT: Yes, sir.
3	MR. WILLIAMSON: The code very clearly says
4	within 60 days or unless agreement by the parties to
5	extend that time. Mr. Musyimi he agreed to this time
6	that was four days afterwards. We set hearing. We gave
7	notice of hearings. That was a month in advance. He
8	agreed to this date. And it's very telling that we're
9	here discussing this right now instead of him discussing
10	it by motion, which is required by the local rules, in
11	writing the day of the hearing on the date of the
12	hearing.
13	He's desperate because he knows that the
14	anti-SLAPP has a lot of teeth and we're here on his
15	agreement to do it on this date that the Court could get
16	us in.
17	THE COURT: Well, let me review the
18	statute. When all else fails read something, or pretend
19	to.
20	MR. WILLIAMSON: Your Honor, would it be
21	okay if I got on my phone to follow along with the code
22	as well?
23	THE COURT: Sure. We are informed never go
24	into the courtroom without our phone because sometimes
25	things go wrong with the electronics and you can't get

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1 out.

A hearing must be set no later than the 2 60th day after date of service. I noticed that last 3 night when I was looking at this that it seemed to be 4 awfully late. Upon showing of good cause because of 5 docket conditions or by agreement of parties, but in no 6 7 event, within 90 days. Mr. Musyimi, did you agree to the date of 8 this hearing? 9 MR. MUSYIMI: I quess, there might be need 10 to clarify the definition of agreement. The question 11 12 becomes should it specifically stipulate in the agreement that the parties have agreed to extend the period of time 13 beyond the 60 days or the agreement of stating that we 14 shall be in court on a specific date that in and of 15 16 itself creates an agreement, meeting of the minds, basically nullifying the need to formally extend the 60 17 18 days. Your Honor, that is an issue that I'm not 19 particularly clear of. Respectfully, ask for the Court 20 21 to clarify that. THE COURT: A hearing must be set not later 22 than the 60th day after the date of service of a motion 23 unless by agreement of the parties. I mean, we are 24 25 required to consult with somebody else before we set a

motion unilaterally. I assume that was done in this 1 Would it be okay if we heard this on the 22nd? case. 2 MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes. Your Honor. Ι 3 believe the Court has discretion to extend it as well. 4 5 THE COURT: Must be for good cause and -you know -- the docket condition, but I think agreeing to 6 7 the hearing on a certain date is agreeing to a hearing more than if it's more than 60 days after then you've 8 agreed to more than 60 days after. And I so find, so 9 I'll overrule it. It wasn't really stated as an 10 objection, but a housekeeping matter. I think it's 11 12 appropriate to have a hearing today. Yes, sir, Mr. Williamson. 13 MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 May I sit down while I go through my case, would that be 15 okay? 16 THE COURT: Sure. 17 18 MR. WILLIAMSON: Your Honor, this is our TCPA Motion to Dismiss, otherwise known as the 19 The defendants have filed the anti-SLAPP anti-SLAPP. 20 21 asking for the case to be dismissed with prejudice and for sanctions to be assessed against the plaintiff. And 22 I'll try not to get into the details of the case too much 23 at this point, Your Honor, before we go into my burden. 24 25 But essentially what we have here is we have a

multi-million dollar special interest group in charge of 1 credentialing for sonography, the No. 1 and the only one 2 in the nation, who saw a statement on LinkedIn --3 THE COURT: This is not a state-wide 4 licensing? 5 MR. WILLIAMSON: It's nationwide. 6 7 THE COURT: All my people. MR. WILLIAMSON: 8 Yeah, everybody. They are a special interest group and what Joanna Hall is is she's 9 somebody that worked in sonography and was -- basically 10 got an injury in terms of ergonomics. And she was also 11 12 interested when COVID was going around --THE COURT: I'm assuming all this is in 13 evidence somewhere? 14 MR. WILLIAMSON: Correct, Your Honor. The 15 evidence is different for my party. We have to show by a 16 preponderance of the evidence and meet our burden, 17 18 however, it doesn't specify for us what the evidence 19 would have to be as it does specify for the plaintiff. The plaintiff must use Summary Judgment standards, 20 21 pleadings, affidavits, and that type of evidence. Your Honor, for us, the Supreme Court of Texas actually said 22 in *Lipsky* that the best evidence in terms of is it an 23 issue of free speech or association is actually the 24 25 pleadings itself. And so a lot of -- most of what we're

1 going to discuss is the pleadings itself.

Now, I could go into the evidence that shows the actual articles that are -- that the plaintiffs are discussing, but as I stated earlier, those are not into evidence at all.

THE COURT: I don't see the distinction 6 7 between one side's evidence as opposed to the other. Under proof 27.006, it says "In determining whether it 8 should be dismissed, the Court shall consider the 9 pleadings, evidence the Court could consider under 10 Summary Judgment and supporting an opposing affidavit 11 12 stating the facts on which the liability or offense is based." 13

MR. WILLIAMSON: If I may respond, Your 14 The specificity is if it is to be dismissed if a Honor. 15 prima facie case has been met, not if the burden of the 16 preponderance of the evidence shows there's an issue of 17 18 free speech. I don't have a problem doing that. That's 19 the majority of what we're discussing today is the pleadings that are out there. 20

21THE COURT: Okay.22MR. WILLIAMSON: And so, Your Honor, if I23can bring your attention in No. 5 is our Motion to24Dismiss and I'm going to try to read -- I'm not going to25read through it, but hit some key points inside of it.

1	THE COURT: Yes, sir.
2	MR. WILLIAMSON: And just as way of
3	background very quickly. What happened here was Joanna
4	Hall, she had an injury, she looked at ergonomics and the
5	issue of injury, her moving somebody's shoulder in the
6	sonography industry. She saw it was lacking. People
7	were begging her to change this and to come up with
8	something different. So she came up with a curriculum
9	and some research. She worked very hard on this and when
10	she started putting this out there people were
11	interested. When she actually wrote her own white paper,
12	as we discussed earlier, Inteleos actually reached out to
13	her and said, hey, we're interested in what you are
14	doing; our Grand Alliance. Why don't you come join us?
15	All you have to do is give up and your work.
16	When that happened she said, well, I'm not
17	too sure, but let's talk any ways. So radio silence at
18	that point. They weren't interested at that point. So a
19	couple of months later she published her paper in January
20	of 2020 '21, excuse me.
21	THE COURT: The publication was an online
22	publication on a website?
23	MR. WILLIAMSON: Correct. Now, that very
24	day Inteleos calls Joanna Hall on the phone to discuss
25	her white paper and the importance of it. They stayed on

1 the phone for 3 hours discussing potential collaborations2 and going forward.

Fast forward, radio silence until the summer of 2021 and they publish their own article and that is the article that has been brought up in the LinkedIn post.

7 Now, Joanna Hall is a single person, a single person entity. She has 3 kids, a disabled veteran 8 husband and she's not a multi-million dollar special 9 interest group. So what they did was they sent her in 10 the summer of 2022, a DC law firm, sent her a letter 11 12 basically saying, Stop. Apologize now. Say what you did was wrong and we're not going to sue you. Also, if we do 13 sue you here's the brief we're going to sue you with. 14 THE COURT: It does says Washington DC law 15 firm, not the DC law firm that Dan Christianson has. 16 No, Your Honor, an actual 17 MR. WILLIAMSON: high-powered DC law firm. I have that in my objection to 18 evidence. 19 THE COURT: He's pretty high-powered. 20 MR. WILLIAMSON: I believe it. 21

So when she did not accept their offer to make her apologize, they found a lawyer in Texas who filed the brief that they drafted and here we are. A single person versus a multi-million dollar special 1 interest group.

2	Now, I'll get to the TCPA. Obviously,
3	Judge, we have to show by preponderance of the evidence
4	we have asserted a legal action that is based on the
5	response of the defendant's exercise of free speech,
6	right to petition, right of association. Specifically,
7	we're going to look at the exercise of free speech and
8	the right of association.
9	Now, they basically literally liberally
10	construed the definition of this in case law because the
11	exercise of free speech broadly includes the
12	communication made a connection with the matter of public
13	concern. And the term "communication" is broadly defined
14	including making or submitting of a statement or document
15	in any form or medium, including oral, visual, written,
16	audio, visual or electric. And when it comes to
17	exercising right of association that the joining together
18	to collectively express, promote, pursue or defend a
19	common interest relating to a governmental proceeding or
20	specifically a matter of public concern, which is a
21	statement or activity regarding the matter of political,
22	social or other interest in the community.
23	And specifically, Your Honor, I have case
24	law that I've indicated in there that health care and
25	health care issues, including how health care involved

1 other people or yourself can be construed as a right for2 a matter of public concern.

Then obviously, once we establish our 3 burden, the burden shifts and they have to prove a prima 4 facie case, which they clearly cannot. And I have on 5 page 4 on the second paragraph, Your Honor, it discusses 6 7 the case I was discussing with. It says, inside the TCPA motion, the Court shall consider the pleadings, evidence 8 the Court can consider under Rule 166, the Texas Rules of 9 Civil Procedure and supporting and opposing affidavits. 10

The TCPA requires that if the Court rejects conclusory claims that includes conclusory case law when he's trying to decide if there's no underlying evidence to support those conclusory facts, Your Honor, and that's what we're trying to avoid by not putting forth the evidence that should have been in in the first place.

So to our argument, Your Honor, on page 5 17 18 is where everything starts and I'll go through it as 19 quickly as I possibly can. Section 4(a) discussing what our elements are. The plaintiff's original petition is a 20 Obviously, we're in a lawsuit. 21 legal action. The petition is a lawsuit, cause of action, petition, 22 complaint or filing that request legal or equitable 23 relief and that's in Texas Civil Practice and Remedy 24 Codes 270.016. 25

Now, moving onto a little more to the 1 weeds. Our issue is based on a right of free speech. 2 This is specifically based on a social media post by the 3 plaintiff -- excuse me -- by defendants, as you heard 4 earlier. The topic, as we've already discussed, is both 5 publications are safety in sonography and that's in 6 7 general, okay. The plaintiffs are insiders in the sonography industry. They are a de facto special 8 interest group who call the shots. They continue to 9 create new steps in financial obligations and that is 10 part of the problem and why we're here today. 11

12 Now, none of that was discussed at all in the lengthy post that you saw earlier. Defendant is an 13 advocate since 2020. She's been trying to get something 14 better and safer. Now, on page 6, Your Honor, on the 15 italicized portion I describe social media posts applying 16 to the TCPA. And Texas courts have very much said that 17 18 the TCPA is to protect the individual's communication in 19 online post when using what we refer to as opinionated criticism, that is an actual doctrine that was set forth 20 in Bedford versus Spassoff the Supreme Court of Texas. 21 And basically that was a youth baseball organization and 22 23 essentially they were asserting business disparagement claims because of what the coach said on Facebook and the 24 25 Supreme Court said essentially, yes, online posts do

1 apply that.

2	The legislature specifically instructs
3	Texas courts liberally to construe the TCPA to effectuate
4	its purpose. Now, regarding the fact they were made on
5	social media, the Texas courts have stated the TCPA
6	defines a communication, which we're dealing with here,
7	the making or submitting of a statement or document in
8	any form, medium, including oral, audio, visible or
9	electronic. That's Weber versus Fernandez out of the
10	Fort Worth Texas Appellate Courts. And it's also cited
11	in the Texas Civil Practice Remedy Code 27.001.
12	Now, something that may or may not come up
13	in this that I would like to discuss very quickly,
14	something that was not that has not been pleaded by
15	the plaintiffs is the fact that the defendant is a
16	limited purpose public figure. And I think that, Your
17	Honor, if Your Honor gets to this point, Your Honor may
18	need to make a decision whether she is a limited purpose
19	public figure for terms of this anti-SLAPP motion.
20	Now, if she's just a private individual,
21	well, then negligence and a negligent standard can go to
22	prove intent and damages. Now, if she's a limited
23	purpose public figure, well, then we have a little issue
24	because then we have to prove malice and intent. And
25	there's two purposes; there's all purpose and general

Now, all that public purpose means is that purpose. 1 she's achieved her basic fame of notoriety because they 2 became public figures for the purpose and the context in 3 which she's dealing with and this would have been 4 sonography. Earlier we saw LinkedIn posts and they are 5 complaining in their own briefs that third parties are 6 7 seeing. That is enough to make her a limited purpose figure, even if it is for a limited range of issues 8 surrounding a particular controversy. And that's in 9 Rodriguez versus Gonzalez that it discusses that. 10

Now, all it has to say, according to *Rodriguez versus Gonzalez,* is the controversy at issue must be public in a sense that people are discussing it and people other than the immediate participants in the controversy are likely to feel the impact of its resolution.

17 The plaintiffs had said specifically they 18 are concerned and they are being damaged to the tune of 19 half a million dollars because so many people are seeing these defamatory statements. The plaintiffs must have 20 21 more than trivial or congenital role in the controversy it's about them. And the alleged defamation must be 22 germane to the plaintiff's participation in the 23 controversy. Germane meaning that she's more than just a 24 25 little innocent bystander in the part of the controversy.

And, Your Honor, I've listed here on page 7 at the bottom, I've gone through these steps specifically and briefed it extensively. I can go forward. I can go through it. I'm going to kind of hit on very quick topics and very quick subjects.

6 So the plaintiffs' original petition very 7 specifically states defendants created a LinkedIn and 8 Facebook post meant for the public at large. They have 9 admitted that. We are not arguing that, in fact, we have 10 seen a LinkedIn post today that third parties would have 11 access through the Internet and that's in the original 12 petition.

The next step is the plaintiff must have 13 more than a trivial or congenital role in the controversy 14 that plaintiffs themselves have stated that the posts and 15 the statements of controversy are made by the defendants 16 are against the plaintiffs and about the plaintiffs, 17 18 making defendants have more than just a trivial role in 19 the issue. And that's despite any reason why the argument that we're involved here. The posts by 20 21 defendants were comparing the subject matter of plaintiffs' publication to one of their own and complain 22 of no reference or credit given as we have already 23 24 discussed.

25

The next thing is the plaintiff -- the

1 defamation must be germane to the plaintiffs'

It's essentially the same issues of 1 and participation. 2 The plaintiffs have a direct link to the controversy, 2. 3 all posts provided to the defendants. So it's not 4 germane with those simple facts. And the posts we're 5 comparing the subject matter of plaintiffs' publication 6 7 to one of their own. So there's issue of germane. So then it comes to the fact of were they an issue of public 8 9 concern.

Now, matter can be public concern and
public issue because the people in public are discussing
it or because people other than the immediate
participants in the controversy are likely to feel the
impact of the resolution.

Now, I bring this up again, half a million dollars where there is zero evidence, there is even zero explanation of where half a million dollars came from. They have to believe they have been damaged by that unless they are saying nobody saw these posts, so we're still damaged half a million dollars. It defies logic and is nonsense.

And I said specifically in the middle of page 9, right under the big A, says further issues that relate to health, safety and community well-being all included in the statutory definition of matters of public

concern and can be related to communications pertaining 1 to the omission of any information or action. And that 2 is Hersh H-E-R-S-H versus Tatum T-A-T-U-M out of the 3 Texas Supreme Court in 2017. And essentially all that we 4 have seen at all in the pleadings is that plaintiffs' 5 subject matter -- defendants own subject matter 6 7 publication was saying that plaintiffs' was similar to That's all that we talked about. The Guardians of 8 hers. the Galaxy-looking compared to another movie. 9

Now, Your Honor, that's the issue with the 10 right of free speech. The next one is very short is the 11 12 defendants were exercising right of association. This is bottom of page 9. Again, the right of association is 13 defined as a communication between individuals who join 14 together to collectively express, promote, pursue or 15 defend common interest. That's *Backes* B-A-C-K-E-S versus 16 Misko M-I-S-K-O. 17

And essentially one of the things that's been stated in a lot of Texas courts, including *Backes*, is when you have an online post, when you have something that is online forum, then that almost automatically makes it an issue of right of association because other people are able to see it.

Now, plaintiffs have very specifically said people can see this awful defamatory post and, therefore, we're damaged to the tune of \$500,000. And I think the
issue there comes into, it's hard to argue that a right
of association if other people are able to see this post
and are interested in this post or disinterested in the
post, it doesn't have to be positive, we have a right of
association issue.

7 THE COURT: Well, in fact, plaintiffs'
8 petition contains a posting that has a response to it.
9 MR. WILLIAMSON: Correct.

10 THE COURT: So obviously somebody saw it,11 whether for or against.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Correct. And that is in their pleadings, not necessarily something they entered into their injunction, Your Honor. And, Your Honor, again, we ask that the burden be shifted and that they prove their case in a prima facie case.

17 Now, I would like to discuss this when I 18 discuss my objections and my reply after requesting for But, again, the Court should dismiss the 19 sanctions. defamation claim. They should award defendants their 20 21 cost fees and sanction the plaintiff. The purpose of the clear and specific requirements they must satisfy 22 elevated evidentiary standard. That's with every single 23 court says, 27.005 TCPA says. That's also included in 24 the Backes we discussed earlier B-A-C-K-E-S. 25

Here the plaintiffs are not able to provide 1 required clear and specific evidence because they have 2 not included any evidence in their response. 3 There are no affidavits. There is no evidence authenticated and 4 under a Summary Judgment standard or a foundation laid 5 They could argue that, well, our pleadings should 6 out. 7 stand that we should be able to discuss the pleadings; however, unlike us, they didn't even reference their own 8 pleadings in their response and I don't think that their 9 response can even be heard. I'm going to discuss that 10 when we discuss my objections to their evidence. 11

But I think at this point, Your Honor, I think that the burden should shift at this point. There's a clear right of free speech. There's a clear right of association, and we're not just assuming that we've met our first burden. We've drafted extensively on this issue and there are plenty in the plaintiffs' own petition discussing it.

Now, further than that, plaintiffs'
response did not argue at all that we could not be heard.
They did not discuss that we can't meet our burden. They
did not discuss any controverting evidence showing that
we did not meet our burden. I think with that they
have waived their right to even discuss or argue that we
haven't because it was not in their response, as a lot of

things weren't, Your Honor. And that's all I have for 1 you. 2 THE COURT: Thank you. I noticed a girth 3 of information in the plaintiffs' response. 4 5 Mr. Musyimi, your response, sir. MR. MUSYIMI: Your Honor --6 7 THE COURT: I do have your response open in front of me here. 8 MR. MUSYIMI: Our position has been and 9 continues to be, this issue is not ripe for dismissal. 10 And the reason being that this company has not been 11 12 completed as of this point in time and through discovery there are pieces of information that will be brought to 13 light that could easily justify the continuance of this 14 15 case. Now, Your Honor, I respectfully refer to 16 the case of Milkovich versus Lorain, a Supreme Court case 17 18 where the U.S. Supreme Court say there's no constitution 19 of distinction between fact and opinion. And, therefore, no wholesome exemption of any statement that can be 20 21 labeled as opinion. The issue instead is whether regardless of the context in which a statement is 22 uttered, it is sufficiently partial to be susceptible to 23 be proven to be true or false. There are various 24 25 statements that have been made by the defendant that,

Your Honor, would rise up to defamation level. The only 1 problem is that we at the very under stages of this case 2 and, therefore, many of those statement have not been 3 brought to light which could easily prove the case for 4 the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs decided --5 THE COURT: Are you saying that there are 6 7 statements made by the defendant about the same subject that you haven't pled in your pleadings or haven't 8 produced for the Court? 9 MR. MUSYIMI: Your Honor, yes. 10 Various statements that we have not produced and the reason is 11 12 because we are still in the under stages of this case. We have sent discovery to the opposing party. Discovery 13 has not been responded to and their responses of those --14 THE COURT: She's made public statements. 15 They are in public. And if she's made private 16 statements, those are absolutely protected if she's 17 whispered to herself someplace, but if she's made public 18 19 statements then you know about those. MR. MUSYIMI: Indeed we do know about 20 public statements she's made. 21 THE COURT: You are not suing them for 22 that. You don't have any evidence of those. Curious. 23 MR. WILLIAMSON: Your Honor, I don't mean 24 25 to interrupt my opposing counsel, but if I may, in terms

of housekeeping issue with a response with the issues 1 with discovery, may I have two minutes to discuss the 2 issues with discovery because I think there is a legal 3 issue and we shouldn't even be discussing it at this 4 point. 5 THE COURT: I don't really need to hear 6 7 anything more. Yes, Your Honor. MR. WILLIAMSON: 8 THE COURT: Thank you. Yes, sir. 9 MR. MUSYIMI: Thank you. Your Honor, the 10 plaintiffs in this case decided they are not public 11 12 figures and, therefore, statements made by the defendant are not protected by the First Amendment of the United 13 States Constitution. Your Honor --14 THE COURT: They are not protected by the 15 Constitution because? 16 17 MR. MUSYIMI: Because the plaintiffs are 18 not public figures. 19 THE COURT: Not public figures, okay. MR. MUSYIMI: Your Honor, I refer the Court 20 to the New York Times. 21 THE COURT: So private people are not 22 permitted to make statements about others? 23 MR. MUSYIMI: No, Your Honor, not 24 25 necessarily so. But the issue of defamation of being

directed to a public figure this time is significantly
different than statements being directed to public
figures versus a private individual.

Your Honor, if I could clarify for the Court. In *New York Times versus Sullivan*, a U.S. Supreme Court 376 U.S. 254. Plaintiffs have -- that they are private individuals whose reputations have been harmed by falsehoods perpetrated by the defendant. They have a legitimate interest in seeking compensation by punitive damages.

In another case, *Gertz versus Robert Welch*, the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment does not require a private individual who is publicly libel to meet the burden of proof of proving malice in order to be awarded punitive damages.

THE COURT: I think you've got it upside 16 down. That's exactly the test. But you said something 17 18 about if they couldn't they are not protected because 19 they are not public figures. The burden -- the standard for showing defamation of a private figure is much lower 20 21 than the standard for proving defamation of a public figure, but I think we're all on the same team here. 22 So let's assume that this does not require malice unless you 23 are some sort of public figure and even then -- well, go 24 ahead. 25

MR. MUSYIMI: Your Honor, defamation is a 1 false statement of fact that is communicated to a third 2 party as is the case here where she published these items 3 on the social media. 4 THE COURT: But there's no evidence that it 5 was false. You presented your client's affidavit and 6 nowhere in that affidavit does she say that the 7 information was false. 8 MR. MUSYIMI: Your Honor, if I may refer to 9 the affidavit. 10 THE COURT: 11 Uh-huh. "When making statement 12 defendant even knew that the statement was untrue or made the statement with reckless disregard as to the truth or 13 falsity of the statement. I believe it was intended to 14 injure my reputation and thereby cause me harm and" --15 but doesn't say anywhere that the information was false. 16 That's the starting point for defamation. They allege 17 she knew the statement was true or made statement with 18 19 reckless disregard as to truth and falsity and never said that it was false, which amazed me when I was reading 20 21 this yesterday. But go ahead, sir, what else would you like to say? 22 Your Honor, just give me a MR. MUSYIMI: 23 second as I log in. You're right. There is no express 24 statement that statements are false. 25

1	THE COURT: Yes, sir. What else would you
2	like to tell me today, Mr. Musyimi?
3	MR. MUSYIMI: Your Honor, if I could
4	respectfully ask the Court to give us to hold this
5	hearing until such time we get the responses to the
6	discovery, then at that point in time the Court would be
7	in a better position to determine whether or not this
8	case should be dismissed. We believe that there are
9	cases pieces of evidence or pieces of evidence that we
10	could obtain during the course of discovery that would be
11	very helpful in this case and would be we will be in a
12	better position to provide guidance to the Court as to
13	whether or not this matter should be dismissed.
14	THE COURT: There's a procedure for getting
15	discovery before the hearing, but it's not accomplished
16	by waiting until the hearing is three-fourths done and
17	then asking for it.
18	MR. MUSYIMI: You are absolutely right,
19	Judge, but Section 27.004 does give the Court the leeway
20	to extend the period of time for as long as the hearing
21	is conducted within less than 90 days or, I believe,
22	120 days, I can't remember exactly. But either way, Your
23	Honor, we believe that completion of the discovery and
24	the responses from the defendants would have significant
25	weight with regards to the totality of evidence that is

necessary for the Court to determine whether or not this 1 is a matter that needs to be dismissed. 2 MR. WILLIAMSON: May I respond to that, 3 Your Honor? 4 5 THE COURT: Well, what do you hope - what do you anticipate that the answers to discovery will 6 7 provide you in the way of evidence, Mr. Musyimi? MR. MUSYIMI: Your Honor, in the request 8 for production we have asked for various documents, 9 various social media postings, et cetera. We are not 10 privy to every piece of social media posting that she has 11 12 posted. We are not privy to every piece --THE COURT: I'm sorry, why not? It's on 13 social media. 14 MR. MUSYIMI: Yes, indeed, Your Honor, but 15 we do not know every single social media pod call that 16 17 she posts. We do not know of every single document that she has posted on social media. The sheer fact it's on 18 social media does not in and of itself mean that it's 19 accessible to everybody. 20 21 THE COURT: She may be on social media that you are not aware of, a different carrier, provider? 22 MR. MUSYIMI: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: I see. Well, has your client 24 25 heard from other people that they saw -- I saw this

horrible thing that she posted about you on "truth 1 social" or "gab", one of my favorites. I check gab.com 2 every once in awhile to see how insane people can be, but 3 -- I didn't say that. 4 I just don't -- you have no case from the 5 -- your pleadings, and to think that you're going to 6 7 somehow gather a case in the future because maybe there's 8 something out there is somewhat speculative, to put it nicely. 9 So, I will not halt in the middle of a 10 hearing to let you do discovery to try to find something 11 12 that might have been looked for before you filed a lawsuit. 13 Anything more, Mr. Musyimi. 14 MR. MUSYIMI: Nothing further, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Anything for your side? Do we 16 have an affidavit on your attorney's fees? 17 We don't have an 18 MR. WILLIAMSON: 19 affidavit, Your Honor. I did file my billing history. Ι didn't know how you wanted to do it. I've seen it done 20 both ways in defamation cases. I've seen it done to 21 where I'll prove them up here, the ones that I have so 22 far because the complete billing for this month, for 23 instance, and there's going to be quite a bit, it's not 24 25 going to be complete. And it seems like -- and this is

-- there is some split on this. It seems like that even 1 though you have the ability to award attorney's fees now 2 and amend it later potentially, it looks like appellate 3 courts are requiring that there is a motion for the 4 attorney's fees done separately after the judgment is 5 signed, done just like a typical way and that is 6 7 typically how it's been done the last four cases. So I could do it by affidavit. 8 THE COURT: Taking a hint from Federal 9 10 court. 11 MR. WILLIAMSON: Exactly. Your Honor, if I 12 could, I would like to respond just for the sake of making my record. And I would like to discuss my reply 13 as well, very briefly if could you give me 5 to 14 10 minutes. 15 THE COURT: All right. What do you want 16 the record to hear, sir. 17 18 MR. WILLIAMSON: All right. So, Your Honor, I would like to go to my objections to his 19 evidence or lack thereof, and if I could point your 20 attention to No. 14 in the binder. This is my objection 21 to the plaintiff's evidence in support of their response 22 and it's my reply, which is specifically in support of 23 sanctions in this. 24 25 And so I was very clearly here, Your Honor,

if you haven't gotten to read it, I would appreciate if 1 you would look at it because I think that I state it very 2 well in the second paragraph under the summary. I'm not 3 trying to use hyperbole here. There is little to respond 4 to a TCPA Motion to Dismiss. And not only is there no 5 burden being proven, I find that what this special 6 7 interest group has done here, which is clearly not look at this case and be a part of this case, they sent it to 8 -- not his fault -- they sent it to Mr. Musyimi and 9 didn't even look at it and they didn't give him the 10 proper evidence and they didn't give him the proper 11 12 background for a defamation case in Texas. That's just not how we do things here. It's highly offensive that 13 this case was filed with zero evidence. It's highly 14 offensive this response showed up with zero evidence. 15 And typically, I would put objections to evidence, which 16 on page 2 I go through what I'm going to discuss here, I 17 18 don't even know how to form the objections because of the 19 lack of evidence in general. There's zero evidence There's zero affidavits. No Summary Judgment 20 attached. 21 evidence standard. Again, like I said earlier, I think they have waived the right to even use their petition or 22 their previous injunction affidavit because they don't 23 even reference it in their own issue. 24 25 Now, essentially in the response it's

factual conclusory statements and legal arguments that 1 kind of go against my legal arguments and my affirmative 2 defenses mostly. And those conclusory statements, those 3 legal arguments cannot be evidence under a Summary 4 5 Judgment standard. And so because of the lack of evidence, I 6 7 object to any of the factual statements in their response being used at all because nothing is authenticated, 8 nothing is backed up through affidavit. There is no 9 Summary Judgment standard and essentially, there is no 10 evidence whatsoever and you cannot form it through the 11 12 issue. Now, the TCPA is made for cases like this. 13 I know you said you hated anti-SLAPP; a lot of people do. 14 The purpose of it, though, if there is a case there is a 15 purpose for, it's this case right here. 16 THE COURT: But what I hate about it is it 17 18 adds a cumbersome process. I agree. And I do 19 MR. WILLIAMSON: plaintiffs also --20 21 THE COURT: To a particular class of case. MR. WILLIAMSON: Correct. And I hate -- I 22 do plaintiffs work also and I hate the way that it's laid 23 out, especially in cases that aren't specific defamation 24 25 cases. That drives me crazy.

1	THE COURT: Yeah.
2	MR. WILLIAMSON: But the TCPA and
3	legislature has specifically said that the issue to
4	effectuate the Act's purpose is to screen unmeritorious
5	claims that the non-movant may not rely solely on factual
6	litigations and legal argument in their pleading, but
7	they have to present evidence that's sufficient as a
8	matter of law to support the rational inference that an
9	allegation of fact is true. Why? It says exactly why,
10	because this is an issue of the Constitution and the
11	Texas Constitution. All factual statements in the
12	response should be struck as unauthenticated and without
13	foundation, and not even reference. And for that reason
14	alone, TCPA motion should fail.
15	Now, on top of this, Your Honor, I kind of
16	got the background of this case. Again, this is a
17	special interest group who has a lot of tossing power in
18	the ball game. What they did was they sent a demand
19	letter and a brief petition to my client, to Mrs. Hall,
20	to scare her. She didn't scare. Then they filed they
21	found a lawyer in Texas to go file a claim that there was
22	literally no evidence of.
23	Now, did they put forth meritorious claim
24	that I'm even concerned could go on appeal? Absolutely
25	not. They didn't even file the two publications that

they are saying or discussing and you mentioned that 1 It baffles me why, but I can tell you exactly earlier. 2 In sonography in the industry, including 3 whv. credentialing, it's largely controlled by Inteleos. Thev 4 have alliances with several groups. Joan Baker is the 5 head of the board of several of these groups and she's 6 7 one of, if not, the most important figure in there. Doctors in the industry give great weight to everything 8 they do. So the group law firm who sent Joanna Hall a 9 demand letter -- by the way this is an attachment, the 10 demand letter is an attachment, I would like you to read 11 12 it, Your Honor -- on August 11th in a draft petition. And why did they do this? Why did they file a claim and 13 not bother to help the attorney that they hired? Why 14 didn't they send him to publications? Why didn't they do 15 That is because it was never about winning this 16 that? claim, not a single time. It was about scaring 17 18 Mrs. Hall. It was trying to silence her and if she 19 didn't listen to them to ruin her. That is their modus operandi in the industry and everything else. 20 Somebody said something they didn't like, so they threw their 21 money around and went after her to try to silence her. 22 That is what the TCPA is meant to defend. 23 She's a working-class mother. 24 25 Representation is not in her budget, but she had to find

1 me, pay me several thousand dollars because there is a
2 tyrant in the industry that sued a single person for half
3 a million dollars.

Now, I would like to talk about that. We 4 didn't even get to that. You have to prove damages in a 5 defamation case. In their petition, in their injunction, 6 7 in their response they never stated a single time how the half a million dollars they were damaged by. 8 It was an arbitrary number thrown out to scare defendants. There's 9 There's no evidence. 10 no damage.

THE COURT: Damages are usually resolved -revealed by the process of special exception eventually, but in the original petition you usually say loss profits, pain and suffering, mental anguish, you know, it adds up to 500,000. That's acceptable.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Well, there's another 16 issue with this case that I'm not even discussing yet 17 18 because I think it's appropriate for special exceptions if it goes forward. 19 Basically, a company and private individuals have sued for business disparagement and not 20 21 called it business disparagement. A company has sued for defamation and not called it business disparagement. 22 And in business disparagement, unlike defamation claims, you 23 have to prove damages. 24

25

Now, in a basic defamation claim, unless

it's pro se, which this is not, unless it's pro se you 1 have to show basically actual damage and that could be 2 based on reputation. But in a TCPA motion in a response, 3 you have to at least prove that one person saw the issue 4 and you were damaged by it somehow. Somehow they 5 responded negatively to that. That hasn't happened here, 6 7 and let me tell you that is cents on the dollar per 8 person.

Now, not only that, a business 9 10 disparagement claim requires actual business damages. This is the wrong claim for Inteleos and they haven't 11 12 even bothered to do it right and that's the issue here is this wasn't done right by a high-powered DC law firm and 13 a special interest group because they don't care what 14 they did to a regular person. A regular person that is 15 only trying to help, like you said, be the safety lady. 16 Inteleos are bullies. Joan Baker is a They are bullies. 17 18 bully. Tricia Turner is a bully. MR. MUSYIMI: Your Honor, I object. 19 MR. WILLIAMSON: Excuse me. I didn't 20 21 interrupt you. THE COURT: I'm sorry, what's your 22 objection? 23

24 MR. MUSYIMI: Your Honor, it's purely 25 speculative what he's alluding to.

THE COURT: He's entitled to speculate in 1 argument. 2 MR. WILLIAMSON: May I continue, Your 3 Honor? 4 5 THE COURT: Yes, sir. MR. WILLIAMSON: They are tyrants of this 6 7 industry, Your Honor. They will do this again. Thev have to be stopped from bringing unmeritorious claims for 8 the sake of making it hard on a regular person. 9 If thev are not stopped from doing it, they will continue to 10 bring these types of attacks. And, Your Honor, I'm 11 12 asking you to send them a message, okay. Please, send them a message that they cannot do this here in Texas. 13 They cannot go against our Constitution and the United 14 States Constitution against free speech and do this for 15 the sake of the sonography industry in general because 16 they are the person ahead. You have David and Goliath 17 18 here. I'm asking you to punish Goliath. The TCPA is made for issues like that, Your Honor. They have asked 19 for half a million dollars from somebody who works on 20 their own and has a husband who is a disabled vet. 21 I'm asking Your Honor for you to sanction, 22 which you have the ability to do to punish people from 23 continuing doing this type of action. I'm asking you to 24 punish them for \$150,000, far, far less than they have 25

asked for, for a half a million dollars thrown out there. 1 They have sued for half a million dollars on something 2 today that we saw no evidence of. 3 And, Your Honor, if I could point your 4 attention before I go, I would like to point out some 5 case law to you. No. 15, I'll turn to it so I can make 6 7 sure I get everything right. I filed this case law. This case law is Kelly Manbeck versus Tiffany Key. 8 This is a trial court ruling on a Motion to Dismiss for TCPA 9 and sanctions were awarded. 10 Now, Your Honor, specifically, and I don't 11 12 do this for my ego; this was my case here. This case is very similar and it is in Travis County. It is very 13 similar --14 THE COURT: Where is your --15 MR. WILLIAMSON: Go to 15, Your Honor, I 16 have a notice of filing on the front page that 17 discusses --18 THE COURT: 19 Yes, sir. MR. WILLIAMSON: You can see Judge Doty 20 granted the TCPA motion, but he wrote a scathing opinion 21 on a case just like this who doesn't have clear evidence 22 against a TCPA Motion to Dismiss before the case was 23 They are discussing discovery. I mean, he filed filed. 24 25 discovery last week. 27.003 clearly says discovery is

1 halted until a TCPA motion is done.

2	There are adequate ways to do that,
3	including pretrial discovery, which should have been done
4	if that's what he wants. But, Your Honor, this is very
5	similar and he discusses a lot of case law that he based
6	it upon. I'm not saying you should base it off what
7	Judge Doty said, but he goes into it quite extensively
8	and in this petition, which was not even close
9	THE COURT: He is auditioning for Federal
10	Judge?
11	MR. WILLIAMSON: I believe that's what it
12	was and I believe he's not on the stand any more. He's
13	going to go for the appellate court. He was a good
14	judge. He worked very hard. This case had over 600
15	exhibits and they weren't clear and he said you cannot
16	bring unclear evidence to Texas courts and ask for this.
17	And he not only awarded attorney's fees because the TCPA
18	was upheld, he sanctioned them \$25,000.
19	This case at hand is far, far worse abuse
20	of process by Inteleos, Joan Baker and Tricia Turner.
21	Your Honor, again, I'm just asking please
22	sanction them \$150,000 so this does not happen again and
23	they know that they cannot come to Texas and do this
24	again.
25	THE COURT: All right, then. Is the case

submitted? 1 MR. WILLIAMSON: That ends our case, Your 2 Honor, and our response. 3 MR. MUSYIMI: Your Honor, if I may just 4 respond? 5 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 6 7 MR. MUSYIMI: Your Honor, it's the position of the plaintiff that a sanction of \$125,000 is excessive 8 and unduly burdensome to the plaintiffs. 9 In this particular matter it's true that pieces of evidence were 10 not available at the time of filing, but it's expectation 11 12 of the plaintiffs to obtain that discovery during the course of discovery. But nonetheless, the objective has 13 not been and never was to injure the defendant in this 14 The objective was for the plaintiffs not to have 15 case. their good name damaged or tarnished in any way by 16 statements that were being published on social media by 17 18 the defendant. The sheer fact that Inteleos Corporation 19 is a big corporation does not in and of itself mean that every time that it files lawsuits they are attempting to 20 21 throw their weight on smaller, quote, unquote, "smaller defendants", but rather it is their right for them to be 22 able to protect their good name and also protect the 23 names of their employees and their teammates. 24 25 Your Honor, we respectfully ask the Court

to refrain from issuing any sanctions against Inteleos
due to the fact that they were only trying to exercise
their constitutional right.

THE COURT: I'm satisfied that I've reached 4 a conclusion in this case and I will give you a partial 5 findings of fact now and, of course, we'll reserve the 6 7 right to supplement those if they are requested by either party at a later time. But I do believe that this 8 lawsuit was brought to deter or prevent the exercise of 9 constitutional right. I believe it was brought for an 10 improper purpose of harassment, and I do not think that 11 12 the plaintiff has proven by clear and specific evidence prima facie evidence of each element of the claim. 13 "There is simply no there there", as 14 Gertrude Stein originally said about Oakland. I kind of 15 like Oakland. 16 17 Having found that -- bottomless, topless,

18 middlest, just not there -- I must award costs and 19 attorney's fees and I will. I'll give the defendant time 20 to produce an affidavit of costs and fees. A week, will 21 that be sufficient?

MR. WILLIAMSON: I can probably run billing. The only issue is typically our billing is quite behind, usually don't have billing until about the 10th and February would be the only thing I'm looking at.

1	I can make it faster if you need me to. If you give me
2	30 days, I can definitely do it.
3	THE COURT: 10th of March. I'll give you
4	30 days to come up with your expression of your costs in
5	attorney's fees and I will give two weeks to, Mr.
6	Musyimi, to respond to that and to produce an affidavit
7	or evidence related to the reasonableness of costs and
8	attorney's fees and it will not be a Summary Judgment
9	sort of situation.
10	I will weigh the costs and attorney fees in
11	light of my almost 50 years experience now and make a
12	determination of what reasonable costs and attorney's
13	fees are in this case.
14	I do believe that this company that calls
15	itself a global what did they call themselves in the
16	petition? A global non-profit community head quartered
17	in Rockville, Maryland; governing, managing, organization
18	for the American registry. A global power. I believe
19	that sanctions sufficient to deter them from similar
20	action would be \$150,000. That sounds like less than
21	what I was considering. See what you did to yourself
22	there? And that will be assessed against all three of
23	the plaintiffs in this case, each of them responsible for
24	the whole amount.
25	And if you will give me orders, I'll sign

an order dismissing then I'll sign the subsequent order. 1 May I approach, Your MR. WILLIAMSON: 2 Honor? 3 4 THE COURT: With sanctions and attorney's 5 fees, yes, sir. MR. WILLIAMSON: I'm showing opposing 6 7 counsel the proposed order that was filed. And, Your Honor, again, I wasn't sure how you wanted to do it, so 8 there's a space for my attorney's fees. But, again, if 9 you want to cross that out we can approach by motion for 10 11 that. Order, claim defamation THE COURT: 12 dismissed with prejudice. I'm not even sure how Inteleos 13 had a claim since they weren't mentioned in the innocent 14 little post. 15 Cost, attorney's fees and other expenses 16 17 and amount fees determining. 18 (Court adjourned.) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	
3	STATE OF TEXAS
4	COUNTY OF TRAVIS)
5	I, Leah Hayes, Official Court Reporter in and for
6	the 419th District Court of Travis County, State of
7	Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
8	contains a true and correct transcription of all portions
9	of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by
10	counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of
11	the Reporter's Record, in the above-styled and numbered
12	cause, all of which occurred in open court or in chambers
13	and were reported by me.
14	I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the
15	proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if
16	any, offered in evidence by the respective parties.
17	WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND this the 23rd day of March,
18	2023.
19	
20	/s/ Leah Hayes
21	Leah Hayes, Texas CSR No. 3973 Expiration Date: 07/31/2023
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23	419th District Court Travis County, Texas
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